
Translation

Posthumanism and Constructionism of the Body in the Film *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*

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Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence, posthumanism, body schema/image, social constructionism, networks and interactions with others

Naomi NEMURA, Nihon University, College of Economics

Abstract

Before attempting to conceptualize the body schema/image in the film *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*, which is directed by Mamoru Oshii, this study compares the film with European and American cyborg films. Based on this comparative review, it is concluded that the film intends to avoid the return to humanism in the postmodern condition where the theoretical and ideological skepticism has arisen, and such thought of the film is called posthumanism.

Next, this study analyzes what kind of body schema/image is created by posthumanism. In the film *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*, the bodies of dolls are interpreted as artificial constructions. The body schema/image constitutes the underlying theme of the entire film, and the bodies of dolls are exactly the representations of human bodies. In other words, the film reveals that the understanding of the body is socially constructed, and such social constructionist perspective of the body frees us from the mystique attached to 'human bodies' as *organic unity*.

Furthermore, according to the body schema/image in the film *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*, 'the construction of the body' is not merely an abstract concept but has boundaries defined in concrete conditions and also this construction can only have the *contingent foundation*: 'the body' can be constructed by networks and interactions with others different from but constituent of oneself. In addition, this understanding of the body may be connected with the concept of respect for others that cannot be understood or valued by humanism.

1. Introduction

To use the argument presented by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari as a reference (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991)¹, we can consider that *art* actualizes possibilities of the world that are concealed when things are organized using certain methods and that *philosophy* conceptualizes them. Then, we can grasp such *art* as a type of “social information” that actualizes the world’s possibilities. Furthermore, as an attempt to decode it and to conceptualize to a clear form of *knowledge*, such *philosophy* can be positioned as one field of “social informatics.” This kind of grasping of “social information” means expanding the range that is treated by “social informatics.” That is, it becomes possible to put various cultural activities into range.

In contemporary cyberculture, there are more and more trends to actualize ‘body’² interpretations created by the electronic environment in which we find ourselves (Zylinska, 2002; Dovey and Kennedy, 2006; Brians, 2011). Based on the argument of Deleuze and Guattari, such attempts seen in contemporary cyberculture may be regarded as *the art* in the sense of presenting the hidden possibilities of the world. Then, the *philosophy* as an attempt to conceptualize such *art* can be understood as indispensable to cyberculture studies. Furthermore, it is possible to understand the kinds of cyberculture trends as “social information” and to consider the cyberculture studies, which decode the above “social information,” as a field of “social informatics.”

In this regard, this paper analyzes the film *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence* (2004), directed by Mamoru Oshii. In the final scene of the prequel *Ghost in the Shell*, the protagonist, Motoko

Kusanagi³ suggests that the investigation of the “ghost” is going toward a new stage (Nemura, 2014). On the other hand, Oshii regards *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence* as a ‘body theory’ (Oshii, 2004: 35-39). When considering all these points, explaining the body schema/image in *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence* can be conceived as not only the key to understanding the “ghost” but also the entire work itself. However, few discussions on exploring body image/schema at the center have been conducted, and the body interpretation in *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence* has not been fully clarified. Thus, this paper attempts to analyze the body image/schema shown in *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence* and puts forth new knowledge and develops understanding about the work.

This paper first explores the underlying thought of *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence* through a comparison with other cyborg films. Then, this study conceptualizes the body schema/image in the film. Based on that, this analysis adds an insight about the connections between the body interpretation and the “ghost” concept.

2. Summary of *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*

The setting is the year 2032, and the coexistence of people, cyborgs, and robots has progressed. Meanwhile, there is frequent terrorism occurring in various places. Batou, a complete cyborg⁴, is a member of Public Security Section 9, known as the “Mobile Armored Riot Police,” which cracks down on such terrorist crimes.

One day, Hadari gynoids, female-shaped androids constructed by the company Locus Solus, begin to slaughter their owners and self-destruct. While such incidents continue to occur, a consignment inspector of Locus Solus is

murdered, which appears to have been done as revenge for the death of a yakuza boss killed by a Hadari. To investigate the yakuza family's relationship with Locus Solus, Batou and his partner, Togusa, attack the family. These conspicuous moves spur Locus Solus into action. They hack Batou and cause him to act recklessly to obstruct the investigation.

Batou, who has believed that not many people can hack him in that manner, becomes suspicious of his old war buddy Kim. Batou and Togusa head toward Kim's mansion after learning his whereabouts from an informant. Batou and Togusa encounter a hacking attack by Kim. However, they capture Kim, breaking out of the trap with the help of both the word inscribed upon the Golem's brow and the watchword for the reunion with Kusanagi "2501"⁵.

Batou and Togusa use Kim's e-brain to infiltrate Locus Solus's factory ship. When they do so, Hadari gynoids on the production line start a wild attack all at once. Batou is surrounded and trapped by the group of Hadaris. However, he is saved by Kusanagi, who has seized control of one of the Hadaris. Kusanagi and Batou get the Hadaris' attack under control and arrive at the truth.

Locus Solus has been using the yakuza to traffic young girls and "dubbing" their "ghosts" into the gynoids. In past animal experiments of "Ghost dubbing," scientists could mass-duplicate inferior copies. However, since it was proven that the original brain would be destroyed, the technology was banned. In this case, the consignment inspector revised the ethic code of Hadaris and was responsible for the Hadaris' attacks. The trafficked girls and the consignment inspector thought that if they could cause violent incidents with Hadaris, someone would come

and save the trafficked girls. However, this plan was exposed, and thus, the yakuza serves the consignment inspector to avenge the yakuza boss.

3. Posthumanism as the Underlying Thought of *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*

As mentioned in the introduction, this paper explains the body schema/image seen in *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*. This is a science fiction film in which the protagonists, who are in a condition where human faculties have been transformed through technology (in other words, they are *cyborgs*), live in a setting in the near future. We can unobjectionably categorize this film as a "cyborg cinema," defined by Sue Short⁶ as "a focus on the intersection between humanity and technology" (Short, 2011 ix) (when this term is used in Short's definition below, quotation marks will be used). In that sense, viewing Short's study of "cyborg cinema" sheds light on the underlying thought of *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence* by comparing it with other films. Thus, by using Short's discussion for clues, this section attempts to explore the assumptions upon which the world of *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence* is based.

3-1. Humanism of "Cyborg Cinema"

As far as Short's discussion goes, the characters in science fiction films as fictional cyborgs symbolize an unavoidable "postmodern condition," that is, a situation in which modern "humanity" is faced with certain crises (Short, 2011:163). According to Short, the characters are given the role of revealing the fact that various theories and ideologies are only partially effective and the foundations on which they stand are

unstable (Short, 2011:192).

Let us look at the examples of *Blade Runner* (Ridley Scott, 1982; Director's Cut, 1992; Final Cut, 2007) and *Total Recall* (Paul Verhoeven, 1990; Remake: Len Wiseman, 2012), both of which are based on original works by Philip K. Dick. In these films, the postmodernist skepticism about the various theories and ideologies that generated trust in modern humanity is expressed through the uncertainty of the characters' identities or of the world in which those characters live.

For instance, in *Blade Runner*, Rachael is a "replicant" (i.e., an android with an organic body) in whom the memory of Dr. Tyrell's niece has been transplanted. She visits the protagonist, Deckard, in an attempt to find out whether she is a replicant. Although Deckard lies and tells her that she is not a replicant, Rachael perceives herself to be a replicant and then disappears. In the director's cut and the final cut, Deckard is depicted to be a replicant himself. In *Total Recall*, the protagonist Quaid is a character who is troubled by some dreams. He visits the Recall Company and tries a machine that implants manufactured memories. After that, he is mysteriously attacked⁷. When he manages to return home, his wife also attacks him. He is then informed that his memories about his marriage have been implanted in him. He then begins to take action to find out who he really is.

However, in these films, re-evaluation of "humanity" under a doubtful gaze is another important element. This is because "in a period where virtually every concept is now subject to theoretical cross-examination and dismissal," such cinema "conceives and corroborates humanity's potential for intellectual growth and ethical responsibility" (Short, 2011:199). The

cyborgs are evaluated in accordance with the degree of resemblance to humans, which, at the same time, leads to a re-evaluation of the value of "humanity" (Short, 2011: 197).

For example, in *Total Recall*, through the battle, Quaid comes to realize who he is. The director of the 1990 version says that in the last scene, he tries to express that those events took place in Quaid's dream⁸. However, since the scene does not explicitly describe this, it is possible to think that Quaid has verified his identity and relation to the world by asking who he is (Short, 2011: 196). Furthermore, Quaid's objective changes, that is, to rescue the people of the colony⁹. In *Blade Runner*, Roy Batty, the leader of a renegade replicant group, saves Deckard, who was hired to kill him.

These characters are perceived not as "passive victims," but as "active agents" (Short, 2011: 197). Moreover, going beyond self-assertion, they are depicted as subjects with collective responsibility (Short, 2011: 198). Thus, while the image of cyborgs in the film that Short calls "cyborg cinema" is burdened with deep skepticism toward "humanity," that is to say, humans' *ability to understand themselves and the world* and their *ability to shoulder social responsibility*, we can see this image functioning to restore our trust in such "humanity."

3-2. *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence* Avoids the Return to *Humanism*

As noted in the science fiction films brought up by Short, the cyborg representation symbolizing the crisis of modern "humanity" returns to the framework of humanism that re-evaluates humans' *ability to understand themselves and the world* and their *ability to shoulder social responsibility*. However, what about *Ghost in the*

Shell 2: Innocence? First, let us look at the following conversation between Kim and Batou about breathing a soul into a doll through “ghost dubbing”:

Kim: That would mean replicating humans by breathing souls into dolls. Who’d want to do that? The definition of a truly beautiful doll is a living, breathing, body devoid of a soul. “An unyielding corpse, tiptoeing on the brink of collapse.”

Batou: Or reduced to a raved body with an e-brain...like you.

Kim: The humans is no match for a doll, in its form, its elegance in motion, its very being. The inadequacies of human awareness become the inadequacies of life’s reality... Perfection is possible only for those without consciousness, or perhaps endowed with infinite consciousness. In other words, for dolls and for gods.

In the dialog between Kim and Batou that follows these lines, it is implied that animals are also equal to dolls or to gods.

Then, Kim says, “Shelley’s skylarks are suffused with profound instinctive joy. Joy we humans, drive by self-consciousness, can never know. For those of us who lust after knowledge, it is a condition more elusive than becoming godhood.” In these dialogs, they display a strong disgust toward the act of breathing human souls into dolls. This is because Kim thinks that the state of human beings, in particular, the “human awareness,” is inadequate and that “the inadequacies of human awareness become inadequacies of life’s reality.” This kind of doubt toward human awareness and the uncertainty of

the reality, created by human awareness, is recognized in the “cyborg cinema” mentioned in the previous section. In that sense, *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence* belongs to the “cyborg cinema.”

However, in *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*, we cannot see the position of trying to reconfirm the value of modern “humanity” by bringing it to cyborgs. In this film, the resolution of the incident does not lead to an acknowledgment of *human characteristics* apparent in the “cyborg cinema”; in other words, it does not lead to *humanism*. Let us look at the scene in which Batou and Kusanagi rescue the young girl who instigated this incident:

Batou: Didn’t he consider the victims? Not the humans... What about the dolls endowed with souls?

Girl: But...But... I didn’t want to become a doll!!

Kusanagi: “We weep for the birds cry, but not for the blood of a fish. Blessed are those with a voice.” If the dolls could speak, no doubt they’d scream, “I didn’t want to become human...”

Here, these thoughts cannot be incorporated into *humanism* that praises humans’ *ability to understand themselves and the world*, and their *ability to shoulder social responsibility*. In this scene, returning to *humanism* is rejected and the line of thought that tries to evaluate others on the basis of those *humanities* is avoided. Such care toward non-human existence does not originate in sympathy arising from similarities as regards “humanity.” What we can see in the words of Batou and Kusanagi is *respect*, which refers to the acceptance of others different from forms of existence articulated by *humanism*. Care for non-human existences in *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence* can be conceived as being based on

respect for different things and not on sympathy toward similar things. Thus, we can say that the incident comes to a close in *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence* through demonstrating respect for different existences which cannot be appraised by humanistic values.

Furthermore, in the last section of *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*, there is a scene with Batou and his dog in which Batou is looking at a girl doll being held by Togusa's daughter. In the previous scene, Togusa's daughter appears and receives the doll as a gift from Togusa. The contrast between the girl and the doll brings to mind the conclusion of the preceding incident. In this scene, Batou is looking at the doll. We will look at this in the next section but, in *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*, Kusanagi is hinted at through a girl doll or through a bird, or otherwise appears as a gynoid. She never manifests in a human form. These things may also suggest that *respect* for different existences that cannot be fully articulated by *humanism* is the underlying thought of *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*.

In this paper, we refer to the stance that rejects the return to *humanism* (in the sense of praising humans' *ability to understand themselves and the world* and their *ability to shoulder social responsibility*) and demonstrates respect for others with their own *heterogeneity* as *posthumanism*. *Posthumanism* in this sense is a point worthy of special attention in *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*, and on that point, we can think of this film as clearly differentiated from the "cyborg cinema" brought up by Short.

This sense of *posthumanism* is in reference to Pramod K. Nayar's "posthumanism," or to be precise, Nayar's "critical posthumanism." When explaining this, Nayar argued that "critical posthumanism is an *ethical project* that asks us to

ponder, and act, upon the acknowledgment that life forms have messy, intertwined histories" (Nayar, 2014: 31). That is, according to Nayar, "critical posthumanism" is an ethical position that opposes the human hierarchization of life forms, for the reason that "such ranking has inevitably resulted in exclusionary practices directed at particular life forms, races, and groups." Furthermore, this project argues for the awakening of responses and responsibilities to others and differences. The stance to avoid placing "humanity" at the center of value and to respect toward others in *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence* corresponds to the "ethical project" of Nayar's "critical posthumanism."

4. Body Schema/Image in *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*

Next, this section explains the body schema/image shown in *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*, continuing to accept that the thought referred to as *posthumanism* is the underlying thought of this film. However, when we wrestle with this theme, we encounter a methodological difficulty. In analyzing *Ghost in the Shell*, a phenomenological method developed by Ingrid Richardson and Carly Harper on the basis of arguments by Maurice Merleau-Ponty was adopted (Nemura, 2014). In this method, the concept of the "body schema" or "body image" asks us to "set aside our prejudices of both science and common sense" and to "reflect on the consciousness of lived experience" (Richardson and Harper, 2002: online). Furthermore, the body understanding that is not caught by the image of both "science" and "common sense" means that the phenomenological notion of the "body schema" or "body image" includes "the concept of a

'fictional' or symbolic mapping of the body" (Richardson and Harper, 2002: online). Accordingly, this paper regards such concept as valid for studying cyberculture, which means various cultural activities related to electronic technology, and attempts to analyze the nature of Kusanagi's bodily experience based on the phenomenological method.

However, in *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*, aside from the scenes in which she rescues Batou (i.e., at Kim's mansion and on the Locus Solus factory ship), Kusanagi is depicted as an *absent* being. Certainly, it is conceivable that Kusanagi's *absence*, which is different from her in *Ghost in the Shell*, indicates the body schema/image of *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*. Nevertheless, it is largely impossible to explore Kusanagi's bodily experience based on her lines. Furthermore, although the climax of *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*, in which Kusanagi appears on the Locus Solus factory ship in the form of a doll (i.e., gynoid), presents the dolls as a very important motif, the dolls are not depicted in the form that allows for the *phenomenological analysis*. The dolls never describe their own bodily experience. Accordingly, this paper employs a somewhat irregular *phenomenological method* of describing and interpreting the body schema/image implied by the dolls, though they do not speak of their own bodily experience, based on varied information.

As mentioned in the introduction, few previous studies have focused on the body schema/image of *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*. To the best of my knowledge, Tamaki Saito tries a psychoanalytical approach and states, "the body begins to become an *imperfect armor*, and multiplies as a frame" (Saito, 2004). Furthermore, Tetsuya Sato adopts an analytical method using

the concept of the "suppression apparatus" and argues that the body has already ceased to function as a suppression engine by beginning to function as a "variable" (Sato, 2004). However, in these discussions, the *phenomenological method* with the acceptance of *posthumanism* is not adopted. Considering this situation, this paper will present knowledge about *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence* that has not been obtained in other arguments up to now.

4-1. The Constructionism of the *Body* Shown by the Dolls

First, let us focus on the scene before the opening credits. Here Batou faces a gynoid that has just killed its owner and a police officer in a dark passageway. After grappling with Batou, the gynoid tears open its own chest while saying, "Help." Batou shoots the gynoid with a shotgun and destroys it.

The gynoid attempts to self-destruct before being shot, and in this process, it reveals that its body is comprised of mechanical parts. In this scene, it could have been possible to depict things in the following order: a gynoid with an intact Japanese doll exterior, the *shooting*, followed by the gynoid in small pieces. In fact, however, this scene preceding the opening credits describes the gynoid that tears its own skin and emphasizes the fact that the gynoid's body is artificially constructed.

The body image as *artificially constructed* segues into the background scene of the opening credits. In this scene, we see the manufacturing process of a gynoid, from "artificial cells to the construction and assemblage of robot body parts" (Brown, 2010: 15). It implies that the bodies of the dolls are artificially made; that is, they are thoroughly constructed. This type of

body schema/image must be a rehashing of the background scene of the opening credits in *Ghost in the Shell*, which suggests that Kusanagi's body is artificially constructed. While connecting to *Ghost in the Shell*, this scene of the birth of the gynoids can be thought to present the body schema/image, which runs through the entire film.

Oshii's inspiration for the doll motif came from Hans Bellmer's ball-jointed dolls (Bellmer, 2011). The dolls in the aforementioned scenes clearly show *visual* influence from Bellmer's works. However, the influence seen in *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence* does not stop at the *visual* level. Bellmer attempts his doll experiments as "corporeal anagrams" (Brown, 2010: 39), in which a body resembles a sentence, that dismantles it into its component letters, and that reconstruction is repeated. In that experiment, Bellmer's dolls are "monstrous machinic hybridities set against the most banal of everyday setting and tableaux, conveying 'gruesome scenes of everyday life'" (Brown, 2010: 40-41). Furthermore, the emphasis on the grotesque and uncanny aspects is none other than an "artistic resistance to the Nazi social regime and its cult of the perfect body" therein (Brown, 2010: 43).

Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence seems to emphasize the depiction of the *process* of assembling the dolls in the shape of a girl, rather than the *image* of the reconstructed body itself. However, it is possible to say that the interest in that process has inherited the anagram perspective of disassembling the components composing the body. Moreover, the sight of a gynoid tearing itself to pieces can be seen as a resistance against the ideal of beauty of "adolescent girls" (Brown, 2010: 47), and it can

be considered that this strong protest against the ideal of the *perfect body* was inherited from Bellmer.

4-2. Doll Bodies=Human Bodies

The next point to be examined is the relationship between *doll bodies* as *artificially constructed and human bodies*. *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence* is sprinkled with lines representing *doll bodies* as the motif with relation to human bodies.

First, when Batou and Togusa visit the lab of Haraway, a police forensic specialist, Haraway says the following: "Unlike industrial robots, the androids and gynoids designed as 'pets' weren't designed along utilitarian or practical models. Instead, we model them on a human imagine, an idealized one at that. Why are humans so obsessed with recreating themselves?" Batou says, "Descartes didn't differentiate man from machine, animate from inanimate. He lost his beloved five-year-old daughter and then named a doll after her, Francine. He doted on her. At least, that's what they say..." Furthermore, in the scene at Kim's mansion, Kim says, "That's why dolls haunt us. They are modeled on humans. They are, in fact, nothing but human. They make us face the terror of being reduced to simple mechanisms and matter. In other words, the fear that, fundamentally, all humans belong to the void."

Each of these lines guides us toward seeing *doll bodies* as *human bodies*. That is, in *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*, *doll bodies* are nothing but the expression of *human bodies*. If that is the case, it is concluded that constructionism of *doll bodies*, clarified in the previous section, represents constructionism of *human bodies*.

Kim's above-mentioned line shows an

understanding of *doll bodies* as *human bodies* and this understanding attempts to reduce bodies to the world of mechanisms and matter. Nevertheless, this line does not seem to assume the existence of a physical substance that should be called the *human body* in that material world.

Certainly, Kim's line: "Further, Science, seeking to unlock the secret of life, brought about this terror. The notion that nature is calculable inevitably leads to the conclusion that humans, too, are reducible to basic, mechanical parts," followed by Batou's line: "The human body is a machine which winds its own springs. It is the living image of perpetual motion," gives us an impression of assuming the *human body* as a physical substance. However, In *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*, the protagonist, Kusanagi, is an *absent* being in most scenes. Her *absence* can be thought to imply that she is embodied through our interpretation. This is indicated by the scenes at Kim's mansion in which Batou and Togusa manage to escape from Kim's trap. In those scenes, Kusanagi's existence is shown through hints in the sights depicted, and her *body* starts to come to the fore through the interpretations of those watching the scene.

For example, a girl doll playing with cards and a dog doll jump into the vision of Batou and Togusa when they first enter Kim's mansion. The girl doll does not explicitly state that she is Kusanagi. However, the girl doll is a "guardian angel," and Batou's "guardian angel" could be none other than Kusanagi. In the third scene in Kim's mansion, the fact that the number "2501," which the girl doll leaves behind, is the password for the reunion of Batou and Kusanagi provides us with another hint that the girl doll is a *manifestation* of Kusanagi.

Just before the scene in which the number

"2501" shows up, the figure of a bird appears for a moment. This scene can be read as implicitly showing that Kusanagi has changed her form to that of a bird. When heading toward the factory ship after escaping from Kim's trap, the figure of a bird that seemed to guide Batou can also be thought to be suggestive of Kusanagi.

If these scenes express that Kusanagi's body appears through our interpretations, the perspective that grasps *the body* as *constructed* assumes that the material world is the incessantly continuing *phenomenon*, and that the body would be rather *absent* there. Thus, as mentioned previously, Kusanagi's *absence* itself becomes an important key for understanding the body schema/image in *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*.

Oshii states the following in a talk with Takashi Tachibana: "Such a thing as a created by the human brain, the body as an illusion. Aside from this, perhaps there is no such thing as a final, original existence of an inherent human body" (Takashi Tachibana and Oshii, 2006). We can also read this statement as being based on the aforementioned body schema/image. Such an understanding of the body can be considered to be based on *social constructionism*. When taking the standpoint of social constructionism, all recognition and description is made within our social relations and is grasped as being mediated by our interactions (Gergen, 2009, 2015)¹⁰. Therefore, all of our bodily recognitions and descriptions is understood as not existing completely away from the grasp of our cultural dimension.

When *Ghost in the Shell* is analyzed, we can see the thought that the awareness of *I* as a *human* is based on the body's *organic components* and that the greater the body's *organic integrity* is, the more certain the *humanity* is (Nemura, 2014),

with reference to Angus McBlane's argument (2010). In contrast to this, in *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*, it is not possible to acknowledge the privilege of *human bodies* as *organisms*¹¹. This is because, when starting from social constructionism, the notion of the body as an *organism* is constructed by our grasping and understanding to sort machines from humans and animate things from inanimate things. When adopting a perspective that grasps the body *as constructed*, the *human body* as an *organism* cannot be regarded as being in a special position that assures the awareness of *I* as the proof of being *human*.

Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence releases us from the mystique of the human body as an organism. That is, if we assume the social constructionist perspective, the main theme of the film is to cast doubts on the essential and exceptional supremacy of the *human body* as an *organism*.

4-3. How is the Body Constructed?

As clarified in this study, the eradication of the *mystique* bestowed on the human body as an organism is the main theme of *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*. This theme is brought to the fore in the scene in which Batou boards the Locus Solus factory ship. In this scene, Kusanagi appears as a gynoid, in a recognizable form. In that scene, the film seems to demand us to understand how the *human body*, which was previously *absent*, is constructed.

For Kusanagi, the *given body* is not assumed, and that its construction comes about in each scene. For instance, the construction of the body as a gynoid is not based on some preceding entity. The body is constructed in the *practice* of chasing the truth of the incident. Its construction or the delimitation of the body is founded on the

"contingency" (Laclau, 1990). As argued by Judith Butler and Donna Haraway, there can be nothing but "contingent foundations" in such a construction (Butler, 1992; Haraway, 2003).

Furthermore, we can consider that the networks and interactions with others create the "contingency" that constructs the body. In the factory ship scene, it is clear that Kusanagi's body is constructed in her relationship with Batou. If we consider that Kusanagi's existence is suggested in the girl doll and the bird at Kim's mansion, we can also see in these scenes that the relationship with Batou constructs Kusanagi's body. Kusanagi is always constructing the body in connection with Batou.

Then, in the scene in which Batou and Togusa escape from Kim's trap, as suggested by Togusa's line of "That I'll never cut it as your partner," Kusanagi and Batou are depicted as indispensable to one another. In other words, we can consider that Kusanagi's body is only constructed through her networks and interactions with *others* that are not herself but rather essential to her (hereafter, "others that are not oneself but rather essential to one" will be expressed as *others*)

In the previously cited talk with Tachibana (Tachibana and Oshii, 2006), Oshii calls "not the body that you have and you were born into, but the second body that you acquired while thinking for yourself and being socialized" the "body." He goes on to explain that "calling it a ghost is cumbersome." He also argues, "the body cannot be born without interactions." Furthermore, Oshii discusses, "whether your partner, your parent, or your child, whether your cat or dog that you've loved for some dozen years, when one of them dies, you feel that the body decreases, a big hole opens up. I think that the recognized body at these times may never recover from such

a large hollow or loss.” These remarks of Oshii show that he presumes that the body schema/image is created through networks and interactions with *others*.

To borrow Richardson and Harper’s expression, this body schema/image presented in *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence* asks us to “set aside our prejudices of both science and common sense” and to “reflect on the consciousness of lived experience” (Richardson and Harper, 2002: online). On this point, we could say that this perspective is identical to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty, 1945)¹². Furthermore, on the point of thinking that the bodily experience is not necessarily limited by the boundary of the skin (Merleau-Ponty, 1945: 173-179), the perspective corresponds to the basic standpoint presented by Merleau-Ponty. On the other hand, the body schema/image captures a point that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology does not focus on; that is, the existence of *others* in our body schema/image.

Furthermore, *others* are not necessarily existences that can be understood and appreciated in the framework of *humanism* that praises humans’ *ability to understand themselves and the world* and their *ability to shoulder social responsibility*. To adapt this to Batou, the *other* is a doll. Certainly, in *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*, the *doll body* is nothing but the representation of the *human body*. Nevertheless, as we have seen in Section 3, Kusanagi’s line, “If the dolls could speak, no doubt they’d scream, ‘I didn’t want to become human...,’” suggests that the dolls cannot be understood and appreciated completely by the framework of *humanism*.

If we consider the bird that leads Batou from Kim’s mansion to the factory ship to be Kusanagi, the *other* at that point is a bird. Moreover, the

basset hound living with Batou in *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence* is an essential being for Batou, similar to Kusanagi. We can see that when Batou is with the basset hound, through their interactions, he lives the way of a different body from the one when working at Public Security Section 9. Then, as confirmed through the dialogs between Kim and Batou in Section 3, this film suggests that animals also cannot be understood and appreciated completely by the framework of *humanism*.

As noted above, in *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*, *others* that cannot be understood and appreciated by the framework of *humanism* are also positioned as beings related to the construction of the human body. We could see this positioning as a form of respect for such *others*. Thus, the body schema/image of *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence* corresponds to the underlying thought of *posthumanism*; at the same time, the body schema/image makes us recognize the underlying thought again.

In this paper, for the sake of convenience, we have analyzed that the body schema/image of *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence* is based on *posthumanism*. However, we can say that these two are actually in a cyclical relationship. This is because the body schema/image itself creates the *posthumanistic* thought and *posthumanism* supports the body schema/image; both do not have a tree structure relationship and neither one of them is leading the way.

5. The “Ghost” in *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*

Finally, this section briefly touches on the subject of how the concept of the “ghost” is related to the body schema/image in *Ghost in the*

Shell 2: Innocence that we have elucidated thus far. In *Ghost in the Shell*, Kusanagi, who is a complete cyborg, harbors suspicions about her own “ghost.” As mentioned previously, in the film, the awareness of *I* based on the body as an *organism* is called “ghost.” Therefore, it is conceivable that Kusanagi inevitably has doubts regarding her own “ghost,” as she hardly has any *organic components* (Nemura, 2014).

However, in *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*, the doubts experienced by Kusanagi in *Ghost in the Shell* are barely mentioned. On the contrary, in the dialog between Kim and Batou, Batou says, “We are both but worthless humans, though we walk very different paths. Of course, if you don’t believe in ghosts, you’ll never know madness or schizophrenia, either,” flatly rejecting Kim’s words that cast doubt on ghosts. Kusanagi also no longer talks about her doubts regarding her “ghost.”

Moreover, *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*, through the concept of “ghost dubbing,” hints that the “ghost” is related to awareness of *I*. At the same time, as examined in Section 4, in *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*, the “ghost” also refers to the body that is created through networks and interactions with *others*. That is, the film suggests that the agency manifests itself through the body made by networks and interactions with *others* and that the body is constructed along with the manifestation of the agency.

Thus, we can see a major turn in the “ghost” concept from *Ghost in the Shell* to *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*. The supporting axis of that turn is the body schema/image examined in this paper. It can be considered that in *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*, Kusanagi no longer has doubt about her own “ghost” because of the body schema/image.

6. Conclusion

This paper analyzed the interpretation of the body demonstrated in *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence* based on posthumanism from the phenomenological method. Such analysis has not been conducted until now.

In *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*, the image of *doll bodies* as *artificially constructed* forms the keynote throughout the film, and those *doll bodies* represent *human bodies*. Then, the body schema/image on *social constructionism* releases us from the *mystique* bestowed on *human bodies* as *organisms*.

Furthermore, in *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*, the body is constructed in concrete situations through its relations with *others*. That is, the body is based on the “contingency” brought about by networks and interactions with *others* that are not oneself but rather essential to one. Moreover, the body schema/image is connected to *respect* for those *others* that cannot be understood and appreciated completely by the framework of *humanism*.

This study has advanced the insight of the body schema/image expressed in *Ghost in the Shell 2* as well as in Japanese cyberculture. For future studies, I intend to examine what types of worlds and life forms can be created based on the body schema/image and *posthumanism* in *Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence*. In particular, I would like to reveal the world and life enabled by the concept of *respect for others*.

Note

1. The reasoning adopted by Deleuze and Guattari referenced in this paper is mentioned in this work repeatedly and can be assessed as a thought that penetrates the entire work,

- although it does not have a uniform expression. Therefore, specific page numbers are not described.
2. From the standpoint of this paper, to make different implications from the existing concept, it seems appropriate to always use quotation marks on the word 'body.' However, after the first appearance, in principle, I do not use quotation marks to avoid redundancy.
 3. The *protagonist* of the "Ghost in the Shell" series, who is the commander of Public Security Section 9, is also called "Major" by her team members. With an e-brain and a complete cyborg body, she exhibits superhuman abilities. In the earlier work, *Ghost in the Shell*, she is depicted as having doubts about her own "ghost" due to an incident involving the Puppet Master. In the final scene, Kusanagi disappears.
 4. The word "complete cyborg" means "extension of artificial arms and artificial legs," that is, to replace the entire body with machinery (Tachibana and Oshii, 2006).
 5. Originally, the name of the project that gave birth to the "Puppet Master" in *Ghost in the Shell*. The "Puppet Master" is a hacking program made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to execute international strategies but has acquired a "ghost."
 6. Short is a media and film studies expert who has presented many papers and works on themes related to film and television.
 7. In the 1990 version, he is attacked by an unidentifiable group including his colleague Harry. In the 2012 version, he is attacked by the police.
 8. In the audio commentary included in the Total Recall DVD released in 2014, Director Verhoeven states that the last bright white scene suggests that all of it is Quaid's dream and that

he is unable to return to reality and has been placed in a vegetative state.

9. In the 1990 version, this is a colonized Mars. In the 2012 version, the area where the underclasses live on Earth is set in Australia.
10. Social constructionism in this paper is based on the arguments presented throughout these works by Kenneth J. Gergen. Therefore, specific page numbers are not described.
11. This way of thinking has entered our lives. For example, according to the final report by the Provisional Commission for the Study on Brain Death and Organ Transplantation in Japan (Umehara, 1992), in light of the reasoning adopted in recent medicine and biology, a "human being" is perceived as one organism system or organic integrated body furnished with consciousness and feeling and it is now commonplace to define the death of such individual as "human death."
12. The thought of Merleau-Ponty, as mentioned here, is recognized throughout this entire work. Therefore, specific page numbers are not described.

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